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Abstract:  
Relatively little empirical evidence exists about countries’ external adjustment to 
changes in fiscal policy and, in particular, to changes in taxes. This paper addresses this 
question by measuring the effects of tax and government spending shocks on the 
current account and the real exchange rate in a sample of four industrialized countries. 
Our analysis is based on a structural vector autoregression in which the interaction of 
fiscal variables and macroeconomic aggregates is left unrestricted. Identification is 
instead achieved by exploiting the heteroscedasticity of the structural disturbances. 
Three main findings emerge: (i) the data provide little support for the twin-deficit 
hypothesis, (ii) the estimated effects of unexpected tax cuts are generally inconsistent 
with the predictions of standard economic models, except for the US, and (iii) the 
puzzling real depreciation triggered by an expansionary public spending shock is 
substantially larger in magnitude than predicted by traditional identification approaches. 
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1. Introduction
The latest nancial crisis has revived interest in the macroeconomic eects of scal policy and
its role as a stabilization tool, as nominal interest rates approached zero, leaving little room for
monetary policy. However, while a large body of work has focused on assessing the eectiveness of
tax and public spending policies in stimulating output and domestic absorption, relatively less eort
has been devoted to studying the implications of those policies for countries' external adjustment
and, by extension, for global imbalances. In particular, to our knowledge, only one paper, namely
Kim and Roubini (2008), attempted to empirically evaluate the reaction of the current account and
the real exchange rate to changes in taxes, and only a handful of studies attempted to measure the
response of those two variables to changes in government spending (Corsetti and Muller 2006; Kim
and Roubini 2008; Muller 2008; Monacelli and Perotti 2010; Enders, Muller and Scholl 2011). This
is somewhat surprising given that the current account is commonly regarded as a barometer of a
country's solvency, and that exchange-rate uctuations critically aect a country's competitiveness
on the world market and its trade balance.
Using structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) and focusing mostly on US data, the papers
cited above nd that unexpected tax cuts and increases in public spending unambiguously depre-
ciate the real exchange rate. Kim and Roubini (2008) also nd that a surprise tax cut worsens the
budget decit but improves the current account, a situation referred to as \twin divergence". On
the other hand, no consensus has been reached regarding the eects of an unexpected increase in
government spending on the current account, or whether it leads to twin divergence or twin decits
(i.e., positive comovement between the budget and external decits).
Generally speaking, these ndings are puzzling from a theoretical standpoint. A wide class of
open-economy macro models indeed predict that an unexpected scal expansion should appreciate
the currency in real terms and deteriorate the current account. In the case of a tax cut, the real
appreciation occurs because there is a higher incentive to invest,1 which raises the real interest rate.
The rise in investment is typically larger than the increase in national saving, causing a current-
1This is the case as long as the tax cut is not lump sum.
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account decit. In the case of an increase in government spending, the appreciation results from the
fact that public expenditures are relatively more intensive in domestically produced goods, which
means that the increase in aggregate demand brought about by the increase in public spending will
raise their relative price with respect to foreign goods. The rise in public spending also entails a
negative wealth eect that induces households to borrow abroad to prevent a large drop in their
consumption, thus worsening the current account.
The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence on the eects of scal policy on changes in
the net foreign position and on the real exchange rate in a sample of four industrialized countries,
namely, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These four countries are
known to have reliable non-interpolated quarterly data on scal variables. Our contribution to the
empirical literature is threefold. First, we provide more comprehensive evidence on the response
of the current account and the exchange rate to changes in taxes than Kim and Roubini, who
focused exclusively on the US. Second, we use an estimation strategy that relaxes the identifying
assumptions used in previous SVAR-based studies, which restrict the interaction of the variables
of interest in a rather arbitrary way. Third, we document the implications of imposing these
restrictions for the response of the current account and the exchange rate to scal shocks.
Our empirical strategy builds on that developed in our earlier work (Bouakez, Chihi, and
Normandin 2010). More specically, we identify scal-policy shocks by exploiting the conditional
hetereoscedasticity of the shocks. When there is enough time variation in the conditional variances
of the time series used in estimation, it becomes possible to identify the structural shocks and their
eects without having to impose additional parametric restrictions, as would be the case under
(the usually maintained assumption of) conditional homoscedasticity (see Sentana and Fiorentini
2001). Incidentally, several studies document that the macroeconomic time series that we use in our
analysis display signicant time-varying conditional volatilities.2 In our framework, the matrix of
contemporaneous interaction nests the parametric restrictions typically imposed in the literature,
2See, for example, Hsieh (1988, 1989), Engel and Hamilton (1990), Garcia and Perron (1996), Den Haan and Spear
(1998), Engel and Kim (1999), Fountas and Karanasos (2007), Fernandez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Kuester,
and Rubio-Ramrez (2010), and Fernandez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramrez, and Uribe (2011).
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thereby allowing one to assess the bias resulting from such restrictions.3
The empirical framework developed in our earlier paper casts scal policy in the context of a
market for newly issued government bonds. The supply of bonds may or may not shift as a result
of changes in taxes or public expenditures, depending on the government's implicit target. In turn,
variations in taxes and public expenditures reect both the automatic and systematic responses of
these variables to changes in economic conditions, as well as scal-policy shocks. We extend this
framework by assuming that the demand for government bonds originates not only domestically
but also abroad, implying that the real exchange rate enters the bond-demand equation. We also
include the current account among the vector used in estimation, while leaving its interaction with
the remaining variables completely unrestricted.
Our results show important dierences in the response of the current account to tax shocks
across the four countries. While the current account remains essentially unresponsive to unex-
pected tax cuts in Australia and the UK, it improves in Canada and deteriorates in the US. In
contrast, the primary budget decit worsens in all cases, implying that the twin-decit hypothesis
(conditional on a tax shock) is supported only by US data. We also nd that the real exchange rate
remains essentially unchanged following the tax cut in Australia and the UK, but that it appre-
ciates signicantly and persistently in Canada and the US. These ndings are novel and have not
been previously reported in the empirical literature. Importantly, they are generally at odds with
the predictions of standard economic models, except in the US. Finally, we show that imposing the
restrictions commonly used to identify tax shocks leads to important mis-measurements of their
eects. For example, the identication schemes proposed by Kim and Roubini (2008) or Monacelli
and Perotti (2010) counterfactually imply that unexpected tax cuts lead to a twin divergence and
to a real depreciation in the US.
3Leeper, Walker and Yang (2008) pointed out that the SVAR approach may not be robust to scal forsight{ the
phenomenon that, due to legislative and implementation lags, economic agents are likely to react to changes in taxes
and governement spending several months before those changes actually take place. In the extreme case where all
scal shocks are anticipated, Leeper et al. show that the resulting time series may have a non-invertible moving
average component, such that it would be impossible to recover the true scal shocks from current and past variables.
In, Bouakez, Chihi, and Normandin (2010), however, we provide suggestive evidence that the scal foresight problem
is not suciently severe to undermine the SVAR approach. This is likely due to the fact that empirical studies mostly
use quarterly data and that an important fraction of the changes in scal policy are implemented within a quarter,
as documented in Mertens and Ravn (2010).
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Regarding the eects of government spending shocks, our results also reveal the absence of a
clear pattern regarding the reaction of the current account. In response to an unexpected increase
in public spending, the current account deteriorates in the UK, improves with a delay in Canada
and the US, and remains unchanged in Australia. For its part, the budget decit shrinks with a
delay in Australia and the UK and worsens in Canada and the US. Again, these ndings lend little
support to the twin-decit hypothesis. As for the real exchange rate, it depreciates signicantly
in all countries, except Canada, where it exhibits a muted and statistically insignicant response.
Interestingly, our results indicate that the magnitude of the real depreciation triggered by an
unexpected increase in public spending is larger than what is found using the commonly used
approaches, making the \exchange rate puzzle" even worse.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical methodology,
including the identication strategy, the estimation method, and the data. Section 3 discusses
the estimation results and the dynamic eects of tax and government spending shocks. Section
4 evaluates the robustness of the results to alternative detrending methods and to an alternative
sample period. Section 5 concludes.
2. Empirical Methodology
2.1 Specication and identication
Assume that the data are represented by the following SVAR:
Azt =
mX
i=1
Aizt i + t; (1)
where zt is a vector of variables that includes output (yt) , the price of bonds (qt), government
spending (gt), taxes (t), the real exchange rate (st) dened as the relative price of a foreign
basket in terms of the domestic basket, and the current account (xt); and t is a vector of mutually
uncorrelated structural innovations, which include scal shocks. Denote by t the vector of residuals
(or statistical innovations) obtained by projecting zt on its own lags. These residuals are linked to
the structural innovations through
At = t; (2)
4
where A  [ai;j ]i;j=1;:::;6 is the matrix that captures the contemporaneous interaction among the
variables included in zt: We cast scal policy in the context of a market for newly issued bonds.
More specically, we assume the following structure:
db;t =  q;t + (y;t   ;t) + s;t + dd;t; (3)
p;t  g;t   ;t = q;t + sb;t; (4)
g;t = gy;t + gdd;t +  g ;t + gg;t; (5)
;t = y;t + dd;t +  gg;t +  ;t: (6)
Equation (3) is the private sector's demand for newly issued government bonds (Treasury bills),
expressed in innovation form. This formulation extends the one proposed in Bouakez, Chihi, and
Normandin (2010) by assuming that the demand for bonds, db;t, depends not only on the price of
bonds, q;t, and on disposable income, y;t ;t, but also on the real exchange rate, s;t, in order to
capture the portion of demand originating in the rest of the world. In this equation, d;t represents
a demand shock and d is a scaling parameter. The parameter  measures the (absolute value of
the) slope of the demand curve, and is assumed to be dierent from 1. The parameters  and 
are the elasticities of this demand to disposable income and to the real exchange rate, respectively,
and both are assumed to be positive.
Equation (4) is (an approximation of) the government's budget constraint, and states that
the innovation in the primary decit, p;t; (i.e., the dierence between government spending and
taxes) must be equal to the innovation in the value of debt, with sb;t being the supply of bonds.
Note that because this constraint is expressed in innovation form, it does not include the payment
for bonds that mature in period t (since those bonds were issued in period t   1).4 Equations
(5) and (6) describe the procedures followed by the government to determine scal spending and
taxes. The disturbances g;t and ;t are the scal shocks that we aim to identify. The former is
a shock to government spending and the latter is a tax shock. The terms g and  are scaling
parameters. Equation (5) states that government spending may change in response to changes in
4For simplicity, this equation also abstracts from seignorage revenues, which have historically been small in indus-
trialized countries.
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output or to demand and tax shocks. Equation (6) has an analogous interpretation for taxes. In
these equations, the parameters g and  measure the automatic and systematic responses of,
respectively, government spending and taxes to changes in output. In this respect, g and  do
not necessarily coincide with the elasticities of scal variables with respect to output estimated
by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), which capture only the automatic adjustment of government
spending and taxes.
Imposing equilibrium in the bonds market and solving for the structural innovations, t; in
terms of the residuals, t; yield0BBBBBBBB@
a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16
  d
 1
d
1
d
 1
d
  d 0
 g(  ) (g g)
g(1  g  )
(1 )(g  g)
g(1  g  )
1 g+ g
g(1  g  )
(1 )(g  g)  g
g(1  g  )
(g  g)
g(1  g  ) 0
  (g g) (  )
 (1  g  )
(1 )( g  )
 (1  g  )
  (g 1) 
 (1  g  )
1+(1 )( g  )
 (1  g  )
( g  )
 (1  g  ) 0
a51 a52 a53 a54 a55 a56
a61 a62 a63 a64 a65 a66
1CCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBB@
vy;t
vq;t
vg;t
v;t
vs;t
vx;t
1CCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBB@
1;t
d;t
g;t
;t
5;t
6;t
1CCCCCCA ; (7)
where aij (i = 1; 5; 6; j = 1; :::; 6) are unconstrained parameters. This specication imposes the
following restrictions: a26 = 0; a36 = 0; a46 = 0; a24 =  (a21 + a23); a32a22 = a35a25 ; and a42a22 = a45a25 .5
The conditional scedastic structure of system (7) is:
t = A
 1 tA 1
0
; (8)
where t = Et 1(t 0t) is the (non-diagonal) conditional covariance matrix of the statistical in-
novations and  t = Et 1(t0t) is the (diagonal) conditional covariance matrix of the structural
innovations. Without loss of generality, the unconditional variances of the structural innovations
are normalized to unity (I = E(t
0
t)). The dynamics of the conditional variances of the structural
innovations are determined by
 t = (I  1  2) + 1  (t 10t 1) + 2   t 1: (9)
5Note that the last two restrictions imply the redundant restriction a42
a32
= a45
a35
:
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The operator  denotes the element-by-element matrix multiplication, while 1 and 2 are diagonal
matrices of parameters. Equation (9) involves intercepts that are consistent with the normalization
I = E(t
0
t). Also, (9) implies that all the structural innovations are conditionally homoscedastic if
1 and 2 are null. On the other hand, some structural innovations display time-varying condi-
tional variances characterized by univariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic
[GARCH(1,1)] processes if 1 and 2 |which contain the ARCH and GARCH coecients, respec-
tively | are positive semi-denite and (I 1 2) is positive denite. Finally, all the conditional
variances follow GARCH(1,1) processes if 1, 2, and (I  1  2) are positive denite.
Under conditional heteroscedasticity, system (7) can be identied, allowing us to study the
eects of scal policy shocks. The sucient (rank) condition for identication states that the
conditional variances of the structural innovations are linearly independent. That is,  = 0 is the
only solution to   = 0, such that ( 0 ) is invertible | where   stacks by column the conditional
volatilities associated with each structural innovation. The necessary (order) condition requires
that the conditional variances of (at least) all but one structural innovations are time-varying.
In practice, the rank and order conditions lead to similar conclusions, given that the conditional
variances are parameterized by GARCH(1,1) processes (see Sentana and Fiorentini 2001). For
further discussion of the intuition underlying identication through conditional heteroscedasticity,
see Bouakez, Chihi, and Normandin (2010).
2.2 Identication under homoscedasticity: Existing approaches
Under conditional homoscedasticity, 15 restrictions need to be imposed on the matrix A in order
to achieve identication. These restrictions constrain the contemporaneous interaction of the vari-
ables of interest in a way that reects the econometrician's judgment about the process by which
policy variables are determined and/or the manner in which they aect certain variables. Existing
approaches to identify scal-policy shocks within SVARs can be grouped into the following four
categories, depending on the resulting shape of the A matrix.
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Recursive scheme
This scheme implies a system in which the matrix A is a lower triangular:0BBBBBB@
~a11 0 0 0 0 0
~a21 ~a22 0 0 0 0
~a31 ~a32 ~a33 0 0 0
~a41 ~a42 ~a43 ~a44 0 0
~a51 ~a52 ~a53 ~a54 ~a55 0
~a61 ~a62 ~a63 ~a64 ~a65 ~a66
1CCCCCCA
0BBBBBB@
vg;t
vy;t
v;t
vx;t
vq;t
vs;t
1CCCCCCA =
0BBBBBB@
g;t
2;t
;t
4;t
5;t
6;t
1CCCCCCA : (10)
In this specication, government spending is predetermined with respect to any other variable in the
system and thus government spending shocks can be obtained simply by a Cholesky decomposition
of the covariance matrix of the VAR residuals, where public spending is ranked rst. This is the
strategy employed by Kim and Roubini (2008), Corsetti and Muller (2006), and Muller (2008)
to identify the eects of government spending shocks on the current account and the exchange
rate. Among the three studies, only the one by Corsetti and Muller (2006) used data from multiple
countries, namely Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US; the two others having focused exclusively
on the US.
The system above also implies that output is predetermined with respect to taxes. Thus,
following a tax shock, the initial response of output is nil by construction. On the other hand,
taxes may respond contemporaneously to unexpected changes in output, reecting the automatic
and systematic responses of government revenue to changes in economic activity. This strategy
of ordering output before taxes in a Cholesky decomposition has only been performed by Kim
and Roubini, whereas the two other studies cited above did not study the eects of tax shocks on
external variables.
Non-recursive scheme (KR)
Kim and Roubini (2008) consider an alternative identication scheme whereby government spending
is still predetermined with respect to all the remaining variables, but where the contemporaneous
interaction of output and taxes is left unrestricted. In order to obtain this additional degree of
freedom, however, a parametric restriction must be imposed elsewhere in the system. Kim and
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Roubini achieve this requirement by setting ~a31 = 0, which yields0BBBBBB@
~a11 0 0 0 0 0
~a21 ~a22 ~a23 0 0 0
0 ~a32 ~a33 0 0 0
~a41 ~a42 ~a43 ~a44 0 0
~a51 ~a52 ~a53 ~a54 ~a55 0
~a61 ~a62 ~a63 ~a64 ~a65 ~a66
1CCCCCCA
0BBBBBB@
vg;t
vy;t
v;t
vx;t
vq;t
vs;t
1CCCCCCA =
0BBBBBB@
g;t
2;t
;t
4;t
5;t
6;t
1CCCCCCA : (11)
Non-recursive scheme (MP)
Monacelli and Perotti (2010) also consider an alternative non-recursive scheme that does not
impose any prior ordering between taxes and output, assuming that the two variables are simulta-
neously determined. However, in contrast to KR, they leave unrestricted the parameter ~a31: Since
such an assumption implies an additional parameter to estimate, Monacelli and Perotti follow the
strategy originally proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) of calibrating the elasticity of taxes
with respect to output based on institutional information. More specically, this elasticity mea-
sures the automatic adjustment of taxes to changes in output. In terms of our notation, such a
specication can be written as0BBBBBB@
~a11 0 0 0 0 0
~a21 ~a22 ~a23 0 0 0
~a31  ~a33 ~a33 0 0 0
~a41 ~a42 ~a43 ~a44 0 0
~a51 ~a52 ~a53 ~a54 ~a55 0
~a61 ~a62 ~a63 ~a64 ~a65 ~a66
1CCCCCCA
0BBBBBB@
vg;t
vy;t
v;t
vx;t
vq;t
vs;t
1CCCCCCA =
0BBBBBB@
g;t
2;t
;t
4;t
5;t
6;t
1CCCCCCA ; (12)
where  is the elasticity of taxes with respect to output. Monacelli and Perotti apply this scheme
to measure the eects of government spending shocks on the current account and the exchange
rate in Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US, though a special attention is paid to the latter
country. It is worth emphasizing, however, that these responses are identical to those that would
be obtained from the recursive or the KR schemes. Only in the case of tax shock would these three
approaches imply dierent results.
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Sign restrictions
An alternative identication strategy to pin down the eects of government spending shock is
the so-called sign restriction approach, which identies the elements of A such that the impulse
responses of interest satisfy a number of shape and sign restrictions imposed by the econometrician.
Enders, Muller, and Scholl (2011) apply this methodology to measure the eects of government
spending shocks on the current account and the exchange rate. Their identication assumptions
ensure that the following restrictions are satised in response to a positive government spending
shock : (i) public spending increases during the rst four quarters after the shock, (ii) the primary
budget decit increases for four quarters, (iii) output increases for two quarters, (iv) investment
increases for six quarters, (v) the nominal interest rate increases for four quarters, and (vi) ination
increases immediately after the shock. The response of the current account and the exchange rate,
on the hand, are left unrestricted.
2.3 Estimation method and data
The elements of A;1; and 2 are estimated using the following two-step procedure. We rst
estimate by ordinary least squares an m order VAR that includes output, the price of bonds, the
current account, the real exchange rate, government spending and taxes,6 and extract the implied
residuals, t; for t = m + 1; :::; T: For given values of the elements of the matrices A;1; and 2;
it is then possible to construct an estimate of the conditional covariance matrix t recursively,
using equations (8) and (9) and the initialization  m = m
0
m = I. Assuming that the residuals
are conditionally normally distributed, the second step consists in selecting the elements of the
matrices A;1; and 2 that maximize the likelihood of the sample.
We use quarterly data covering the period 1973-1 to 2008-4. The analysis is performed for
Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US. The choice of this sample of countries is mainly motivated
by the availability of non-interpolated quarterly data on scal variables at the general government
level. The series used in estimation are constructed as follows. Output is measured by real GDP.
6The benchmark specication includes a constant, a quadratic trend, and four lags.
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The price of bonds is measured by the inverse of the gross real return on 3-month treasury bills,7
where the GDP deator is used to deate the gross nominal return. The current account is dened
as the change in net foreign assets and is expressed as a fraction of GDP, and the exchange rate is
measured by the real eective exchange rate, which is constructed such that an increase corresponds
to a real depreciation. Government spending is dened as the sum of federal (defense and non-
defense), state and local consumption and gross investment expenditures. Taxes are dened as
total government receipts less net transfer payments. The spending and tax series are expressed
in real terms using the GDP deator. Output, government spending and taxes are divided by
total population and all the series, except the current account to output ratio, are expressed in
logarithm. The data sources and further details on the construction of the series are provided in
the Appendix.
3. Results
This section discusses the estimation and test results, as well as the dynamic responses to tax and
government spending shocks implied by (7). It also compares these responses to those obtained by
imposing the identifying restrictions commonly used in the literature.
3.1 Parameter estimates and specication test
For each country, we estimate a 4-order VAR (m = 4). Table 1 reports the p-values associated with
the McLeod-Li test statistic applied to the squared VAR residuals. In the vast majority of cases,
the test rejects the null hypothesis of absence of autocorrelation in the squared VAR residuals at
1, 2 and 4 lags. This result hints to the presence of conditional heteroscedasticity in the statistical
innovations, which is likely to translate into time-varying conditional variances of the structural
innovations.
Table 2 presents the estimates of the GARCH(1,1) parameters. For each country, the estimates
indicate that the conditional variances of (at least) ve structural innovations are time-varying, and
7We found the results to be robust when we measure the price of bonds using the return on 10-year treasury
bonds.
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that the conditional variances of the structural innovations are linearly independent, thus satisfying
the order (necessary) and rank (sucient) conditions for the identication of system(7). The table
also shows that government spending shocks exhibit a conditional volatility that is moderately
persistent for Australia and Canada, but highly persistent for the UK and the US{ where the
persistence is measured by the sum of the ARCH and GARCH coecients. On the other hand,
the conditional volatility of tax shocks is highly persistent for all the countries except the US. A
more telling representation of these conditional variances is provided by Figure 1. The gure shows
important time variation in the conditional variances of both scal and non-scal shocks, which
often display alternating episodes of high and low volatility. These results corroborate the ndings
of earlier studies that documented the presence of conditional volatility in the time series of output
(Fountas and Karanasos 2007), the nominal interest rate (Garcia and Perron 1996; Den Haan and
Spear 1998; Fernandez-Villaverde et al. 2010), the exchange rate (Hsieh 1988, 1989, Engel and
Hamilton 1990, Engel and Kim 1999), and scal variables (Fernandez-Villaverde et al. 2011).
Does the GARCH(1,1) specication provide an adequate description of the process that governs
the conditional variances of the structural innovations? To answer this question, we test whether
there is any autocorrelation in the ratio of the squared structural innovations relative to their
conditional variances. The Mcleod-Li test results, reported in Table 3, indicate that the null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected at any conventional level of signicance for 1,
2 and 4 lags. This suggests that the GARCH(1,1) process is well specied.
Next, we turn to the estimates of the structural (bond-market) parameters, which we report in
Table 4. The estimates of  indicate that the slope of the demand for newly issued government
bonds is negative and statistically signicant for all countries. The estimates of  are positive and
statistically signicant in all cases, indicating a positive relation between the demand for bonds
and disposable income. The elasticity of demand for bonds with respect to the real exchange rate,
, is precisely estimated only for the US, but has the expected sign in all cases. The parameters
measuring the automatic/systematic responses of government spending and taxes to output, g and
 respectively, are statistically signicant for Canada and the US. The point estimates of  for
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these two countries are substantially larger than the elasticity estimated by Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) for the US, thus indicating that the systematic response of taxes to changes in output is
quantitatively important. The parameters g and  are mostly statistically signicant, whereas
the opposite is true for  g and   . Finally, the scaling factor of government spending shocks, g,
is smaller than that of tax shocks,  .
The parametric restrictions implied by our model, i.e., a26 = 0; a36 = 0; a46 = 0; a24 =
 (a21 + a23); a32a22 = a35a25 ; and a42a22 = a45a25 , are tested using a Wald test. The p-values associated with
the test statistic, reported in Table 5, indicate that these restrictions cannot be rejected at any
conventional signicance level for Australia, the UK, and the US. For Canada, these restrictions
cannot be rejected only at the 4 percent (or lower) signicance level. Since system (7) appears to
be generally supported by the data, we henceforth refer to it as the unrestricted system and to its
implications as the unrestricted ones.
3.2 Dynamic eects of tax shocks
Figure 2 depicts the dynamic eects of an unexpected tax cut on output, the primary budget decit,
the current account and the real exchange rate. The rst observation that emerges from this gure
is that there is, in general, a similarity in results between Australia and the UK on the one hand,
and Canada and the US on the other hand. Notwithstanding that tax cut is much less persistent
in Canada and the US than in Australia and the UK, it leads to a persistent and statistically
signicant increase in output in the former countries, whereas in the latter the output response
is muted on impact and mostly statistically insignicant. The negative tax shock deteriorates the
primary budget decit in all four countries, but the eect is larger and much more persistent in
Australia and the UK than in Canada and the US.
In contrast, the response of the current account in the former two countries is at and indistin-
guishable from zero. Hence, there is no evidence of twin decits or twin divergence conditional on
tax shocks for these two countries. On the other hand, the tax cut improves the current account
in Canada, thus moving budget and external decits in opposite directions{twin divergence. The
opposite scenario occurs in the US, where the tax cut worsens both the budget decit and the
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current account-twin decits. Therefore, there is no overwhelming evidence that, in a response
to a tax shock, budget and external decits move in tandem. In addition, these results provide
little support to the hypothesis that the likelihood and magnitude of twin decits increase with
the degree of openness of an economy (see Corsetti and Muller 2006). Finally, Figure 2 shows that
the real exchange rate is unresponsive, in a statistical sense, to the tax cut in Australia and the
UK, but that it appreciates signicantly in Canada and the US, although in the latter case, the
exchange rate response ceases to be signicant six quarters after the shock. These results constitute
the rst novelty of the present paper, as no empirical evidence exists about the eects of tax shocks
on external variables in countries other than the US. Importantly, we nd that the US is an outlier
inasmuch as it is the only case where the eects of unexpected tax cuts are generally consistent
with the predictions of standard economic models.
How do these results compare with those obtained by imposing the identifying restrictions used
in earlier studies? Answering this question enables one to assess whether or not and to what extent
those restrictions are innocuous. To conserve space, we restrict the comparison to the case of the
US. Figure 3 superimposes on the unrestricted responses obtained for the US those implied by the
recursive identication scheme discussed in Section 2 and by the two non recursive schemes employed
by Kim and Roubini (KR) and Monacelli and Perotti (MP).8 In all cases, the system is estimated
under the assumptions of conditional heteroscedasticity, so that any dierence in results between
the unrestricted and restricted systems would be solely attributed to the parametric restrictions
on the coecients of the matrix A. The gure shows that the three sets of identifying restrictions
lead to important counterfactual implications. First, both the recursive and MP schemes severely
understate the output response, predicting that it is essentially nil at all horizons, whereas the KR
scheme implies that output actually falls in a response to a tax cut. Second, the three restricted
systems imply that the unanticipated decrease in taxes worsens the budget primary decit and
improves the current account in the US, which contradicts the twin-decit result obtained under
the unrestricted specication. Finally, the tax cut leads to a real depreciation of the US dollar
8These authors also focus on the US.
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under the three alternative identication schemes, whereas the unrestricted system predicts a real
appreciation.9 These ndings clearly show that imposing arbitrary parametric restrictions in order
to achieve identication can lead to mistaken inference about a country's external adjustment to
tax shocks.
3.3 Dynamic eects of government spending shocks
The impulse responses to an expected increase in government spending shock are illustrated in
Figure 4. The shock is expansionary in all four countries, leading to a persistent and statistically
signicant increase in output, except in the US, where the positive eect on output becomes statis-
tically insignicant ve quarters after the shock. The increase in government spending deteriorates
the primary budget decit in Canada and the US, and improves it in Australia and the UK,10
although in the latter case, the eect is mostly statistically insignicant. The current account
remains unresponsive in Australia, improves in Canada and the US, and deteriorates in the UK.
Thus, conditional on a government spending shock, there is stronger evidence of twin divergence
than twin decits. Again, we nd little support for the hypothesis that twin decits are more likely
to occur in more open economies. Finally, Figure 4 indicates that the real exchange rate depreciates
in a response to an unexpected increase in public spending, except in Canada, where the response
is muted and statistically insignicant. This depreciation contradicts the predictions of standard
open-economy models.
Figure 5 compares the results for the US with those obtained from the identication schemes
used in existing studies, namely the recursive and sign-restriction approaches. Note that the dy-
namic responses to a government spending shock implied by the KR and MP are identical to those
implied by the recursive approach, since all of these systems assume that government spending is
predetermined with respect to any other variable and impose the same number of exclusion restric-
tions. In implementing the sign-restriction approach, we imposed the following restrictions on the
9The results obtained under the KR identication scheme are consistent with those reported in Kim and Roubini
(2008), which are based on a shorter sample period.
10It is possible to obtain an improvement in the budget decit following an expansionary public spending shock
because our specication allows for an endogenous adjustment in taxes following such a shock, whereas earlier
approaches restrict the initial response of taxes to be nil.
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dynamic responses to a positive government spending shock: (i) government spending increases for
4 quarters, (ii) the primary budget decit (as a fraction of output) worsens for four quarters, (iii)
output increases for two quarters, and (iv) the real price of bonds falls on impact.11
At short horizons, the results obtained from the recursive and sign-restriction approaches re-
garding the response of the budget decit and the current account to a government spending shock
are generally similar to those obtained from the unrestricted specication. All three approaches
predict a worsening of the budget decit and an improvement of the current account in the US
in response to an expansionary spending shock. At longer horizons, however, the two alternative
approaches under-estimate the response of the current account. More important discrepancies exist
when it comes to the response of the real exchange rate. While the recursive approach yields a
real depreciation, the latter is much smaller in magnitude than that predicted by the unrestricted
system, especially at short horizons (up to two years). The sign-restriction approach, on the other
hand, predicts that the median exchange rate response is very small in magnitude and changes
sign during the rst 10 quarters after the shock, but that there is so much uncertainty about such
a response, that one cannot in fact reject the hypothesis that it is actually nil. Together, the
results imply that the \real exchange rate puzzle" is worse than one may think based on traditional
approaches.
4. Robustness Analysis
We now study the robustness of the results to alternative detrending methods and to an alternative
sample period. Recall that the benchmark results discussed so far were obtained from a system
in which variables are expressed as deviations from a quadratic trend, and which is estimated
over the post-1973 period. In this section, we report results based on systems in which variables
are expressed (i) in levels, (ii ) as deviations from a linear trend, (iii) in rst dierences (except
the current account and the real exchange rate, which are expressed in levels). We also estimate
the system (with quadratically detrended data) for the post-1980 period, given that some studies
11These restrictions are very similar to those imposed by Enders, Muller, and Scholl (2011), though not exactly the
same. The reason is that our estimated system diers slightly from theirs. The dynamic responses we obtain using
this approach are nonetheless remarkably similar to those reported by these authors.
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suggest the presence of a structural break around the year 1980 (see Perotti 2005). We again
restrict our attention to the US and report the results in Figure 6 for the case of a tax shock, and
in Figure 7 for the case of a government spending shock. In the case where the data is expressed
in rst dierences, the reported responses are those of the variables in levels and are obtained by
cumulating the responses of the variables in rst dierences.
In general, the responses to a tax shock obtained under the alternative detrending methods are
fairly similar to (and often statistically indistinguishable from) the benchmark responses, especially
at short horizons. The only exceptions are the responses of output when the variables are expressed
in levels and as deviations from a linear trend. On the other hand, the responses obtained for the
post-1980 period are relatively smaller in magnitude than those pertaining to the entire sample
period, although the wedge is generally not signicantly large. An even stronger similarity in results
between the benchmark and the alternative estimations is observed in the case of a government
spending shock. The only notable dierence concerns the response of the real exchange rate, which
is smaller in magnitude in the post-1980 period than when the entire sample period is used in
estimation.
To summarize, this robustness check conrms the message conveyed by the benchmark analysis
regarding the adjustment of the US current account and exchange rate to scal-policy shocks: A
surprise tax cut deteriorates the current account and appreciates the real exchange rate, whereas
a surprise increase in public spending improves the current account with a delay and depreciates
the real exchange rate.
5. Conclusion
This paper has investigated the eects of scal policy shocks on the current account and the
exchange rate using an empirical methodology that relaxes the commonly used identifying assump-
tions, and which instead achieves identication by exploiting the conditional heteroscedasticity of
the structural shocks within an SVAR.
Notwithstanding that the eects of scal policy shocks are not always consistent across the
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four countries included in our sample, we found some similarities between Australia and the UK
on the one hand, and Canada and the US on the other hand. More importantly, we found little
support for the twin-decit hypothesis regardless of the underlying scal shock. We also found that
the eects of unexpected tax cuts are generally at odds with standard economic theory, except for
the US. Finally, our results indicate that unexpected increases in public spending depreciates the
currency in real terms in all but one country (Canada). While this puzzling depreciation (from
the perspective of standard open-economy models) has also been documented by other studies, our
results indicate that those studies severely understate the magnitude of the exchange rate response,
thus suggesting that the \exchange rate puzzle" is worse than one might think based on traditional
identication approaches.
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Appendix: Data Construction and Sources
This appendix describes the data used in this paper. The sample covers the 1973-1 to 2008-4
period for Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US. For Australia and the UK, the data are taken
from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) released by the International Monetary Funds,
the Main Economic Indicators (MEI) and Economic Outlook (EO) released by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, and from Datastream. Data for Canada are collected
from the databases released by Statistics Canada (SC), while data for the US are taken from the
National Income and Products Accounts (NIPA), the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint-Louis' Fred
database (FRED), and the Federal Reserve Statistical Releases (FRSR).
Output is measured by the nominal GDP (sources: EO for Australia and the UK, SC for
Canada, and NIPA for the US) normalized by the GDP deator (sources: EO for Australia and
the UK, SC for Canada, and NIPA for the US). The price of bonds is constructed as the inverse
of the gross real return, where the GDP deator is used to deate the gross nominal return. The
nominal return is measured by the 90 day commercial bill rate for Australia (source: MEI), the
3-month treasury bill rate for Canada (source: SC), the UK (source: IFS), and the US (source:
FRED). Except for the US, the exchange rate is dened as the consumer price index-based real
eective exchange rate (source: MEI). For the US, the exchange rate is measured by the trade-
weighted real exchange rate index against major currencies (source: FRSR). The current account
(sources: EO for Australia and the UK, SC for Canada, and NIPA for the US) is expressed as a
percentage of GDP. Government expenditures are measured by the sum of consumption and gross
investment expenditures of the general government (sources: EO for Australia and the UK, SC
for Canada, and NIPA for the US) normalized by the GDP deator. Taxes are dened as total
receipts of the general government less net transfers (sources: EO for Australia and the UK, SC for
Canada, and NIPA for the US) normalized by GDP deator. Output, government spending and
taxes are expressed in per capita terms by dividing them by total population (sources: Datastream
for Australia and the UK, SC for Canada and FRED for the US). Output, government spending,
taxes, the price of bonds and the exchange rate are expressed in logarithm.
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Table 1. Heteroscedasticity Test Results
Lag Australia Canada UK US
2y;t 1 0:043 0:988 0:003 0:025
2 0:000 0:777 0:013 0:040
4 0:000 0:623 0:032 0:159
2q;t 1 0:129 0:725 0:017 0:862
2 0:192 0:014 0:054 0:046
4 0:027 0:083 0:212 0:012
2g;t 1 0:038 0:055 0:021 0:077
2 0:012 0:009 0:061 0:032
4 0:029 0:021 0:226 0:075
2;t 1 0:008 0:014 0:481 0:003
2 0:014 0:044 0:024 0:012
4 0:059 0:038 0:000 0:045
2s;t 1 0:680 0:111 0:014 0:459
2 0:041 0:141 0:015 0:605
4 0:029 0:000 0:053 0:406
2x;t 1 0:578 0:050 0:326 0:000
2 0:066 0:076 0:443 0:001
4 0:055 0:151 0:636 0:003
Notes: Entries are the p-values associated with the McLeod-Li test statistic applied to the squared
VAR residuals.
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Table 2. Estimates of the GARCH(1,1) Parameters
Australia Canada UK US
1;t 0:293
(0:189)
0:250
(0:135)
0:881
(0:225)
0:596
(0:278)
0:690
(0:194)
0:703
(0:152)
  0:163
(0:202)
d;t   0:110
(0:079)
0:098
(0:288)
0:159
(0:162)
  0:848
(0:127)
0:032
(1:536)
0:721
(0:314)
g;t 0:116
(0:173)
0:273
(0:189)
0:063
(0:070)
0:095
(0:152)
    0:937
(0:083)
0:621
(0:798)
;t 0:504
(0:194)
0:072
(0:101)
0:408
(0:236)
0:212
(0:172)
  0:856
(0:224)
0:135
(0:220)
 
5;t 0:244
(0:098)
0:089
(0:082)
0:305
(0:165)
0:062
(0:071)
0:705
(0:122)
0:889
(0:124)
  0:927
(0:085)
6;t 0:031
(0:140)
0:119
(0:145)
0:304
(0:184)
0:499
(0:286)
  0:084
(1:026)
0:318
(0:319)
 
Notes: Entries are the estimates (standard errors) of the parameters of the GARCH(1,1) processes.
For each structural innovation, the rst and second rows refer to the ARCH and GARCH coe-
cients, respectively. A dash ( ) indicates that zero-restrictions are imposed to ensure that 1 and
2 are non-negative denite.
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Table 3. Specication Test Results
Lag Australia Canada UK US
21;t 1 0:804 0:774 0:484 0:407
2 0:962 0:921 0:339 0:665
4 0:928 0:996 0:626 0:718
2d;t 1 0:916 0:782 0:908 0:966
2 0:974 0:955 0:992 0:847
4 0:961 0:971 0:999 0:590
2g;t 1 0:974 0:704 0:821 0:499
2 0:113 0:818 0:864 0:543
4 0:171 0:722 0:857 0:681
2;t 1 0:826 0:662 0:724 0:995
2 0:523 0:275 0:648 0:534
4 0:367 0:279 0:794 0:583
25;t 1 0:145 0:595 0:531 0:238
2 0:634 0:533 0:563 0:201
4 0:589 0:487 0:374 0:483
26;t 1 0:959 0:848 0:802 0:786
2 0:978 0:942 0:965 0:882
4 0:929 0:748 0:993 0:591
Notes: Entries are the p-values associated with the McLeod-Li test statistic applied to the squared
structural innovations relative to their conditional variances.
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Table 4. Estimates of the Structural Parameters
Parameter Australia Canada UK US
 0:844
(0:186)
0:549
(0:243)
1:066
(0:195)
1:099
(0:168)
 1:193
(0:120)
0:919
(0:132)
0:986
(0:294)
0:884
(0:111)
 0:073
(0:097)
0:012
(0:104)
0:056
(0:165)
0:267
(0:104)
g 0:484
(0:480)
 0:237
(0:741)
0:602
(1:230)
0:515
(0:258)
 1:134
(1:197)
12:038
(6:393)
1:152
(1:914)
5:783
(2:027)
g 0:732
(0:159)
0:425
(0:192)
1:001
(0:153)
0:371
(0:179)
 1:176
(0:192)
1:001
(0:726)
0:490
(0:320)
 0:076
(0:859)
 g  0:186
(0:114)
 0:037
(0:056)
0:017
(0:301)
0:153
(0:124)
  1:372
(1:818)
 2:571
(2:472)
0:428
(2:734)
 8:774
(6:874)
d 0:019
(0:003)
0:018
(0:007)
0:027
(0:005)
0:011
(0:005)
g 0:004
(0:005)
0:007
(0:002)
0:005
(0:017)
0:003
(0:002)
 0:036
(0:007)
0:056
(0:027)
0:040
(0:009)
0:025
(0:012)
Notes: Numbers between parentheses are standard errors.
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Table 5. Test of the Parametric Restrictions
Australia Canada UK US
P-value 0:619 0:040 0:948 0:612
Note: Entries are the p-values of the 2-distributed Wald test statistic associated with the restric-
tions a26 = 0; a36 = 0; a46 = 0; a24 =  (a21 + a23); a32a22 = a35a25 ; and a42a22 = a45a25 .
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Figure 1: Conditional variances of the structural shocks.
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Figure 2: Unrestricted dynamic responses to a negative tax shock.
Notes: The solid lines correspond to the dynamic responses to a negative tax shock extracted from the
unrestricted system for each country. The dotted lines are the 68 percent condence intervals computed
using the Sims-Zha (1999) Bayesian procedure.
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Figure 3: Dynamic responses to a negative tax shock: Alternative identication schemes
Notes: The solid (dashed) lines correspond to the dynamic responses to a negative tax shock extracted from
the unrestricted (alternative) system for the US. The dotted lines are the 68 percent condence intervals
computed using the Sims-Zha (1999) Bayesian procedure.
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Figure 4: Unrestricted dynamic responses to a positive government spending shock.
Notes: The solid lines correspond to the dynamic responses to a positive government spending shock
extracted from the unrestricted system for each country. The dotted lines are the 68 percent condence
intervals computed using the Sims-Zha (1999) Bayesian procedure.
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Figure 5: Dynamic responses to a government spending shock: Alternative identication schemes.
Notes: The solid (dashed) lines correspond to the dynamic responses to a positive government spending
shock extracted from the unrestricted (alternative) system for the US. The dotted lines are the 68 percent
condence intervals computed using the Sims-Zha (1999) Bayesian procedure for the recursive case and
the 68 percent intervals of the admissible dynamic responses for the sign-restriction case.
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Figure 6: Dynamic responses to a negative tax shock: Robustness analysis.
Notes: The solid lines correspond to the dynamic responses extracted from the unrestricted system for the
US. The dashed lines correspond to the responses computed using alternative detrending methods and an
alternative sample period. The dotted lines are the 68 percent condence intervals computed using the
Sims-Zha (1999) Bayesian procedure.
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Figure 7: Dynamic responses to a positive government spending shock: Robustness analysis.
Notes: The solid lines correspond to the dynamic responses extracted from the unrestricted system for the
US. The dashed lines correspond to the responses computed using alternative detrending methods and an
alternative sample period. The dotted lines are the 68 percent condence intervals computed using the
Sims-Zha (1999) Bayesian procedure.
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